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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF KINGS: PART 52
36170 REALTY LTD,

Petitioner,

INDEX NO.
56347/2011

-against-

DECISION/
ORDER
HON. KATHERINE A.
LEVINE

MICHAEL BOYD,

Justice Supreme Court

Respondent-Tenant
__________
Petitioner

36170 Reality Ltd. (“petitioner” or “landlord”) brings

this holdover proceeding to evict respondent tenant against Michael Boyd
(“respondent” or “Boyd”) and to recover a rent-controlled apartment
(Apt. 3A) located at 36 Clark Street, Brooklyn in which Boyd currently
resides. Petitioner commenced this action upon the death in 2010 of Boyd’s
mother, Elizabeth Boyd, who was the tenant of record, contending that
Boyd was not entitled to succeed to the statutory rights of his mother since
she was merely a licensee.

1

This case raises novel issues of interpretation regarding the exception
to

9 NYCRR §2204.6(d)(1).

Under New York City’s rent stabilization

and control regulations, a family member who has resided with a
rent-controlled tenant for at least two consecutive years prior to the
tenant’s death may claim succession rights to the tenancy. 9 NYCRR §
2204.6(d)(1); 90 Elizabeth Apt. LLC v Eng, 58 Misc. 3d 300, 301 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. Co. 2017). However, §2204.6(d) contains exceptions to this two year
residency requirement.

It provides that the minimum period of required

residence shall not “shall not be deemed interrupted by any period during
which the “family member” temporarily relocates because he

...(c)“is not

in residence at the housing accommodation pursuant to a court order not
involving any term or provision of the lease, and not involving any grounds
specified in the [RPAPL]”

9 NYCRR § 2204.6 (d)(1)(iii).

At issue is

whether the conditions of Boyd’s parole and supervised release
the

fall within

meaning of a “court order” and, if so, whether these conditions of

parole arose out of any activities which fell within the scope of Real
Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”), §§ 711 and 715 which
prohibit any part of the premises from being “used or occupied as a
bawdy-house, or house or place of assignation for lewd persons, or for
purposes of prostitution, or for any illegal trade or manufacture, or other
illegal business.”
Respondent asserts that he is entitled to succession rights because he
resided with his mother until his incarceration in May 2002, and that after
his release from prison and parole, he resumed his residency with his
mother in 2009.

He therefore falls within the exception to the two year

residency requirement governing succession rights, as contained in 9 NYCRR
§2204.6(d), because the conditions of his parole, requiring him to stay away
from his mother’s apartment for part of
2

the two year period immediately

before his mother’s death, was part and parcel of the underlying court
order and criminal conviction.

Petitioner counters that conditions of

parole are not equivalent to a court order since Boyd’s agreement to stay
away from his mother’s apartment was “voluntary” and had nothing to do
with his criminal conviction.

It further argues that regardless of the legal

meaning of the conditions of parole, as a matter of law Boyd could not
succeed to the tenancy since he engaged in “illegal trade, manufacture, or
other illegal business” as prohibited by §§ 711 and 715 of the RPAPL.
Respondent counters that Boyd’s criminal conviction of a sex act involving a
minor, and burglary, did not fall within the intent of

RPAPL §711(5) ,

which is commonly referred to as the “bawdy house, illegal use or drug
house” statute.
As will be detailed below, this Court reaffirms its previous ruling that
the conditions of parole are part and parcel of a court order, and that in
order to be on parole Boyd had to accept the conditions offered by the
Parole Board.

Therefore,

Boyd’s absence from the apartment was a

mandatory condition of parole and fell within the exception to the
residency requirement provided by 9 NYCRR § 2204.6 (d)(1)(iii).
However, respondent cannot reap the benefit of this exception without
having the court also probe into the incidents leading to the parole order
which mandated that Boyd could not reside in his mother’s residence.
Since the parole conditions flowed ineluctably from the sentence, which
contained an order of protection for eight years, this court concluded that
the parties could present evidence of the underlying conduct which led to
the sentence and order of parole.
The court also finds that Boyd used both his mother’s apartment and
the entire premises, including the roof of the building, to manufacture a
3

technological apparatus which enabled him to constantly tape a minor
engaging in sexual conduct for about a year and view her in
his camcorder in or about his mother’s

apartment,

apartment to create multiple tapes of the minor.

“live time” on

He also used the

He therefore used his

apartment to engage in illegal manufacturing or business for more than “an
isolated use” and his activities fell within the prohibitions listed under
RPAPL §§ 711 and 715 so as to defeat any claim to succession rights.
Furthermore, Boyd’s actions constituted a modern day version of using the
premises for lewd and immoral conduct which also defeated any claim to
succession rights

Procedural History and Basic Facts
History of Criminal Action
By

a lengthy decision and order dated November 21, 2001,

Judge Patricia DiMango ruled on defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.
Dimango first set forth that Boyd was charged with burglary in the second
degree ( Penal Law §140.25 (2) on two separate dates and five counts of
possessing a sexual performance by a child in violation of Penal law
§263.16.

Judge DiMango first recited the testimony of the two

apprehending police officers who decided to search Boyd’s knapsack after
observing him engage in strange behavior.

The officers removed a “Sony

Digital Handycam” camera with a fold out LCD screen which depicted six
pictures of

a female lying naked in bed. The camera also contained a video

cassette tape of a female masturbating.

The police officer handcuffed and

frisked Boyd and brought him to the precinct without telling him
was under arrest.
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if he

While in custody, Boyd admitted that he had additional video tapes of
the girl at the apartment.

The detective and officers went to the

apartment and Boyd gave the officers a plastic bag filled with video tapes,
covering a period of almost one year, which depicted a naked girl lying in
bed and masturbating. Boyd also had “a VCR with a television set and a
computer monitor with a CPU tower, which appeared to contain a porthole
for eight-millimeter tapes.” Subsequently, one of the officers returned to
the premises with a search warrant. Upon executing the warrant, he
recovered the CPU unit, CD-ROM disks, floppy discs, pornographic
magazines, and what appeared to be VHS tapes and other tapes. Soon
thereafter, a detective discovered the identity of the female on the video
tapes, and proceeded to the minor female’s apartment where the door was
answered by her father. After being shown the images from the camera, the
father identified the images on the tape as being of his daughter (14 years
of age) and the room in the picture as her bedroom.

He recounted to the

police that several weeks earlier his daughter had complained that she
thought she had seen a camera outside her window which was on the top
floor of the building.
Defendant sought to suppress all of the physical evidence obtained
from the time of the street encounter through and including the return of
the search warrant, and also sought to

suppress statements he made to

the police at the station house because he was not informed of his Miranda
warnings.

He claimed that all of the evidence was improperly obtained

pursuant to illegal searches and seizures and be suppressed as fruit of the
poisonous tree after the police acted improperly when they initially
approached him as he sat on a stoop in Brooklyn.

5

Judge DiMango

first found

1

that Boyd’s initial reactions upon

countering the police on the stoop gave rise to a “founded suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot” and elevated the encounter to the “common
law right to enter.” The search of the plastic bag was necessary as the police
could not rule out the presence of a gun, although the officer thereupon
discovered that the “gun” was in fact a video camera simultaneous with his
seeing the six pinhole pictures.

The images thus came into “plain view”

through no police misconduct and the police officer properly investigated
the identity and whereabouts of the female and properly seized the camera.
Since the police came into possession of the camera in a lawful manner, the
court denied suppression of the camera of any of its contents.
.
Judge Dimango also found that the police officer’s discussion with
Boyd at the precinct to find out the name and location of the teenage
female was proper under the “public safety” exception to the Miranda rule,
given the officer’s concern for the welfare of the teenager.

The detective

did not attempt to elicit evidence of a crime but attempted to ascertain the
minor’s status.

However, after returning from his visit to the house where

the minor resided, the detective’s

further questioning of Boyd constituted

“custodial interrogation” as his purpose was to elicit
the crime.

information about

Although Boyd refused to listen to the Miranda warning, the

court found that there was no reason why the police did not continue to
apprise Boyd of his rights before continuing their interrogation.

As such,

Judge Dimango found that any interrogation which took place at this point
was unconstitutional and all the evidence which flowed from such
interrogation had to be suppressed as “fruits of the illegal interrogation.”
This opinion will only briefly discuss Justice DiMango’s decision on suppression of
evidence since this court concludes, infra, that such suppressed material may be introduced in
this civil proceeding.
1
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This included defendant’s statements and the tapes that the police
recovered from Boyd’s apartment as well as all the evidence recovered
pursuant to the execution of the search warrant.
As will be set forth below, the scope of the evidence recovered from
Boyd’s apartment, much of which was suppressed in Judge DiMango’s
decision, are quite relevant to a determination as to whether Boyd engaged
in “illegal trade, manufacture, or other illegal business” as prohibited by §§
711 and 715 of the RPAPL.
The Certificate of Disposition Indictment, dated June 4, 2010,
indicates that on April 10, 2002, Boyd was convicted, after a bench trial
before the Hon. J. Firetog, of the crime of

“Possessing a Sexual

Performance by a Child in violation of Penal Law (“PL”) 263.16 ( an E
Felony) relating to 17 tapes found in his apartment which depicted a naked
14 year-old neighbor lying in her bed masturbating.

Judge Firetog also

convicted Boyd of Burglary in the 2d Degree in violation of PL 140.25 -(a
C Felony) for

breaking into the victim’s apartment on two dates and

installing a video camera in the air conditioner in the victim’s bedroom. On
May 29, 2002, Justice Firetog sentenced Boyd to imprisonment of one to
three years, and issued an order of protection of eight years
of Possessing a Sexual Performance by a Child.

for the crime

Justice Firetog also ordered

imprisonment of five years for the crime of Burglary in the 3d degree and
stated that there would be Post- Release Parole Supervision for three years.

On or about September 5, 2006, Boyd was

granted parole. Boyd’s

release from prison was conditioned upon his acceptance of 26 conditions,
violation of which would result in his reimprisonment. One of the conditions
7

prohibited Boyd from visiting his mother’s apartment because of its
proximity to the minor victim’s apartment.
that Boyd

This was the only reason

did not return to live in the apartment immediately after his

release from prison. On or about September 5, 2009, upon completion of
his parole term, Boyd began living in the apartment with his mother again.
Boyd’s mother died on December 27, 2010, at which point Boyd had lived
in the apartment for about one year and four months
Petitioner brought a Holdover Petition against Boyd in Civil Court
Housing Court seeking to recover possession of the subject apartment, and
thereafter moved for

summary judgment on the grounds that Boyd did

not reside at the subject premises as his primary

residence for the two

years immediately preceding the death of his mother.
the same defenses raised herein - that

Respondent asserted

Boyd fell within the exception to

the two period pursuant to 9 NYCRR §2204.6(d).

By Order dated

September 10, 2012 , Judge Lansden denied the motion for summary
judgment, finding that there was a dispute as to whether the parole officer
actually “ordered” Boyd to stay away from the residence.

He also found

that a question of law existed as to whether the parole officer’s orders were
analogous to incarceration, and whether these instructions or orders
“curtailed the free will of the parolee.”

The court also noted that

irrespective of the exceptions listed in the statute, the courts have
analogized certain situations such as incarceration or placement in a
psychiatric institution to meet the requirements of court order.

Based

upon this decision, petitioner requested a jury trial2 and the case was
transferred to Civil Court. Four years were consumed by motion practice
over a myriad of issues too voluminous to reiterate herein.
2

At the urging of the court, petitioner at some point withdrew his request for a jury trial.
8

Whether the Conditions of Parole are Tantamount to Court
Order
This court first ruled that once a landlord has shown that the tenant
of record has died in a

holdover proceeding involving a rent-controlled

tenant, the burden then shifted to the party claiming succession rights (here
Boyd) to present legally sufficient proof to “establish contemporaneous
residency with the tenant.” Pavel v Fischer, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op 52452[U],
*3, 21 Misc. 3d 143[A] (App Term 2008) citing Gottlieb v Licursi, 191
A.D.2d 256 (1st Dept 1993).

Petitioner clearly proved that Mrs. Boyd

died and that Boyd did not reside in the premises for the two years
immediately preceding her death.

“Thus, Boyd bears the burden of

establishing his residency and showing that his absence from the apartment
was pursuant to a court order not involving any term or provision of the
lease, and not involving any grounds specified in the RPAPL.” The court also
ruled that a landlord could bring a proceeding to evict under the RPAPL for
illegal conduct at any time.
Throughout the duration of the trial,

petitioner persisted in arguing

that the “court order” exception does not apply to Boyd’s absence because
the terms of Boyd’s parole and supervised release were a “voluntary”
absence pursuant to an administrative determination by the Department of
Parole and, thus not a court order.

Petitioner further asserted that a

court order can only be written by a judge whereas the special conditions of
Boyd’s parole were promulgated by the Parole Board, an administrative
agency outside the control of any court and collateral to any court order.
To that end, Boyd’s parole conditions did not amount to a court order
9

because the collateral consequences of a criminal sentence, which include
conditions of parole, are not a court order (citing People v Stevens, 91
N.Y.2d 270 (1998) (post-release and registration requirements for sex
offenders are distinct from criminal sentence).
Boyd claimed that he is entitled to succession rights because the terms
of his parole and post release supervision were part of a court order which
is a

“direct consequence” of his criminal conviction, which has a “definite,

immediate and largely automatic effect on defendant's punishment,” as
opposed to a “collateral consequence” which is peculiar to the individual and
generally result from actions taken by agencies the court does not control.
Citing to People v. Catu, 4 N.Y. 3d 242 (2005) and

People v. Ford, 86

N.Y. 2d at 403 (1995), Boyd argued that the Court of Appeals considered
a parolee a warden of the state because “parole neither extends nor
shortens a criminal conviction.”

The condition that Boyd stay away from

his mother was mandatory because under the parole agreement, if he
violated this condition he would be returned to the legal custody of the
warden in prison.
Parole proceedings are considered to be a phase of the criminal
proceeding.

Penn. Bd. Of Probation and Parole v. Scott. 524 U.S. 357,

365, 141 L. Ed 2d 344 (1998); United States v. Medrano, 2012 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 104700 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

“Parole is a "variation on imprisonment of

convicted criminals,(Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477, 33 L. Ed. 2d
484 (1972),) which is part of a “continuum of state- imposed
punishments.” Robinson v. N.Y. State, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144553 (N.D.
N.Y. 2010) citing to Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850, 165 L. Ed 2
250 (2006). “The essence of parole is release from prison, before the
completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain
10

rules during the balance of the sentence,”
477.

Morrisey, supra, 408 U.S. at

The State “accords a limited degree of freedom in return for the

parolee's assurance” that he will comply with the strict terms and
conditions of his release.”

Scott, supra, 524 U.S. at 364.

The

enforcement leverage that supports the parole conditions derives from the
authority to return the parolee to prison to serve out the balance of his
sentence if he fails to abide by the rules.”

Id at 478-68; Robinson v. N.Y.

State, supra at 11. See also, People ex rel. Petite v Follette, 24 N.Y.2d 60,
62-63 (1969) (“(T)he Parole Board may ameliorate the conditions of his
sentence by allowing him to serve the remainder of it outside the walls of
the prison on parole. While a prisoner is on parole, his sentence continues to
run until its maximum term has expired. However, if a prisoner commits
some violation of the conditions of his parole,... the running of his sentence is
halted until his return to prison where he may be required to serve the
maximum amount of his sentence remaining...”

)

The general statutory scheme which inextricably intertwines the
Department of Correctional Services with the Division of Parole was
succinctly described in Mtr of Oriole v. Saunders, 66 A.D. 3d 280 (1st Dept.
2009). Pursuant to Penal Law § 70.40 [1], [3] [a]), a

convicted person

released from incarceration on parole continues to serve his or her sentence
while on parole and earns credit toward the maximum expiration date of
the sentence unless and until the Division of Parole declares that person to
be delinquent and revokes parole.

66 Ad. 3d at 281.

If parole is not

revoked, a parolee is deemed to be in the legal custody of the Division of
Parole "until expiration of the maximum term or period of sentence"
(Executive Law § 259-I [2] [b]).
delinquent,

However, once a parolee is

declared

the sentence is interrupted as of the date of delinquency, and

the interruption continues until the parolee's return to an institution under
11

the jurisdiction of the Department of Correctional Services (Penal Law §
70.40 [3] [a]). As a result, the term of the interrupted sentence is
extended, beyond the original maximum expiration date, for a period of
time equal to the delinquency period.

Id at 281.

See, Mtr of Tineo v

New York State Div. of Parole, 14 A.D.3d 949, 950 (1st Dept. 2005) where
the court found that the petitioner was not

entitled to a parole revocation

hearing because his parole was revoked by operation of law upon his
conviction of a crime while on patrol.

Pursuant to Penal Law §70.40(3),

the original sentence was interrupted by the delinquency and the
interruption continued until the petitioner was returned to DOCS custody
whereupon he owed the time remaining on his prior sentence.

See, also,

Mtr of Washington v. Dennison, 42 A.D.3d 830 (3d Dept, 2007 People ex
rel. Melendez v Bennett, 291 A.D. 2d 590, 590 - 591 (2002); Mtr of
Cruz v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 288 A.D. 2d 572, 573
(2001).
“There is no federal or state constitutional right to be released to
parole supervision before serving a full sentence, and, accordingly, the state
has discretion

to place restrictions on parole release.”

People ex rel

Stevenson v. Warden of Rikers Island, 24 A.D. 3d 122, 123 ( 1st Dept.
2005) citing to Mtr. Of
1997).

M.G. v Travis, 236 A.D. 2d 163, 167 (1st Dept.

Parole release remains a statutory grant of “a restricted form of

liberty”prior to the expiration of a sentence. People ex rel Johnson v.

Superintendent, Adirondack Corr. Facility, 174 A.D. 3d 992994 (3d Dept.
2019), citing to People ex rel. Matthews v New York State Div. of Parole,
58 NY2d 196, 204 [1983].
impose

The State Division of Parole may therefore

restrictions or conditions

before or after an inmate’s release from

prison (see Executive Law § 259-c [2]; 9 NYCRR § 8003.3); including
reasonable residential restrictions as a condition precedent to release. See,

Mtr. of Boss v. N.Y. State

Div. Of Parole, 89 A.D. 3d 1265-66 (3d Dept.
12

2011) (special condition that petitioner secure approved residence prior to
his release from prison

given his conviction for sex offenses perpetrated

against two young girls).

In fact, the Board may impose special

conditions “which must be satisfied prior to an inmates’ release from
prison.”

Mtr of Breeden v. Donnelli, 26 A.D. 3d 660, 661 (3d Dept.

2006) (condition that the prisoner procure an approved residence prior to
his release where he has a history of criminal behavior, including multiple
serious sex offenses); Mtr. Of

Lynch v West, 24 AD3d 1050, 1051

(2005).
Simply put, any inmate facing parole, including Boyd, simply has no
“bargaining power” with the Parole Board as to the conditions of his release
and has a very limited right of appeal.

The case cited by petitioner -

People v. Stevens, 91 N.Y. 2d 270 (1998) - is inapposite and does not hold
that the conditions of parole are “a collateral consequence” of a criminal
sentence.

At issue in Stevens was whether a convicted sex offender had a

discrete right to appeal a “risk level determination” - which is a post
service of sentence classification under the pursuant to CPL 460.20.

A risk

level determination is a post service of sentence classification under the Sex
Offender Registration Act (Megan’s law”).

The court found that the post

sentence registration and notification requirements under the act are not a
“traditional, technical or integral part of a sentence that somehow relates
back to or becomes incorporated into the antecedent judgment of
conviction.”

91 N.Y. 2d at 964. See also, People v. Hernandez, 93 N.Y. 2d

261, 270 (1999)(Stevens deemed a risk level determination to be
“post-sentence” since the determinations were assigned to them after
release from prison).

Here, on the other hand, Boyd’s sentence was not

fully served at the time he was on parole.

Rather, Boyd’s parole extended

to the final date of his sentence, albeit outside of the prison, and any
13

violation of parole would have caused Boyd to revert back to the status of
prisoner where he would have to serve the remainder of his service
incarcerated.
The testimony of

Boyd’s Parole Officer - Glenda Bubb - confirmed

the mandatory nature of this condition.

Bubb was a Parole Officer

supervising sex offender cases from 2006-09 and supervised Boyd from
September 2007 until he reached his maximum expiration date or release
date of September 2009.

Boyd’s release sheet from the Mohawk

Correctional facility had a total of 26 conditions, 14 of which were specific
to Boyd based upon his conviction

and “the requirements for a successful

parole supervision in the community.”

Bubb did not

present these

conditions to him; this happened while he was in jail.
The first page, entitled “Application for Conditional Release to Parole
Supervision” states that Boyd was sentenced by Judge Firetog on May 29,
2002 for a maximum term which expired on May 25, 2007, that he would
be in the legal custody of the Division of Parole for three years until
September 5, 2009, and that he would abide with the conditions of his
release “with the full knowledge that failure to do so may result in
imprisonment” by the Division of Parole.
included

Some of the Special Conditions

participation in sex offender treatment/counseling; no association

or communicating in any ways with the victim and her family without
permission of the PO, and compliance with all orders of protection.

The

Special Conditions of Release to Parole Supervision included additional
prohibitions such as not entering a place within 50 feet of places where
children congregate, not picking up children at any time, not frequenting
areas of pornographic activity, not participating in any on line computer
service that involved the exchange of pornographic emails or established
14

sexual encounters or liaisons.

Boyd also agreed not to purchase or possess

pornographic or video equipment without permission of his parole officer,
and not purchase or engage in the use of pornographic or erotic materials.
Bubb testified that he was not allowed contact with children under 18
because his victim was a minor.

The prohibition against Boyd

participating in online computer services was a special condition generated
for sex offenders whose crimes involve using a computer.
During his period of supervision Boyd lived at the Kingsboro Men’s
shelter.

Bubb stated that this was not by choice but “by parole’s direction.”

When Boyd was released from

supervision, he had no other address

except where his crime was committed.

“We would not allow him to live

there. That’s standard rule that we have...for any parolee that they can’t live
where they committed the crime...regardless of the crime.” Boyd visited, but
was not allowed to live with his mother because of

special conditions that

would not allow him to live within a 1000 feet of a school and the mother’s
house fell within that zone.”

Bubb also informed

Boyd that he could not

visit his mother's residence without her knowledge or permission. After he
retained an attorney, visitation was arranged with his mother at a specified
time and date, which was specifically chosen to avoid him running into
minors.

Bubb performed a curfew check on Boyd and Boyd never violated

his curfew.

Bubb said that if she went to the shelter and he was not there

she would have sent him back to jail immediately. If Boyd had violated his
parole, he would go back to a correctional facility for a minimum of 12
months.

Boyd completed parole without any interruption or violation of

his supervision.
In sum, this Court reiterates its previous ruling that the conditions of
parole were

part and parcel of the court order, and that had Boyd stayed
15

in jail for the full duration of his sentence, as opposed to spending part of it
on probation, he would have been entitled to the exception to the two year
residency requirement.

The statutory framework makes it crystal clear

that the condition imposed by the Parole Board that Boyd stay away from
his mother’s apartment was inextricably linked to his court sentence, and
that his release was predicated upon his agreeing to this condition, a
violation of which would have landed Boyd back in prison for the duration of
his sentence .
WHETHER BOYD’S ACTIVITIES INVOLVED ANY GROUNDS
PROHIBITED

UNDER THE

RPAPL

The remainder of the trial concerned whether Boyd could prove that
he fell within the exception to the two year residence requirement,
contained in

9 NYCRR § 2204.6 (d)(1)(iii),

because the court order

(and subsequent terms of parole) did not involve any grounds specified in the
RPAPL.

Both sides agree that the pertinent sections of the RPAPL are §§

711(5) and 715.

RPAPL § 711 (5) (the “Bawdy House Law”)

permits

a landlord to institute a special proceeding to evict a tenant if the premises
or any part thereof was “used or occupied as a bawdy-house, or house or
place of assignation for lewd persons, or for purposes of prostitution, or for
any illegal trade or manufacture, or other illegal business.”3

RPAPL § 715(1) defines a class of additional persons who have

3

standing to assert the claim and grants them legal capacity to commence
such a proceeding if, after notice, the owner of the premises fails to proceed
under §711(5).

Hudsonview Co. V. Jenkins, 169 Misc. 2d 389, 391 (Civil

Ct., N.Y. Co. 1996)..

Section 715 governs eviction for illegal use or

occupancy by someone other than the landlord.
16

The

wording to these

These statutory provisions were “intended to protect the health,
welfare and safety of the public residing in the same community as well as
the tenants

who reside in the same building.”

City of New York v.

Wright, 162 Misc. 2d 572, 573-574 (App. Term 1st Dept. 1994). The
purpose of the illegal use evictions under these two statutes is not to provide
an additional penalty for criminal behavior but to for further the public
policy to

“protect the inhabitants of communities from prostitution,

gambling and drug dealing.”

54 West 16th st. Apt. Corp. V. Dawson, 179

Misc. 2d 264, 268 (Civil Ct., N.Y. Co. 1998).

See, RRW Realty Corp. V.

Flores. 179 Misc. 2d 757, 760 (Civil Ct., Bronx Co. 1999).
In order to prevail under RPAPL§§ 711 (5) and 715, petitioner must
show that the premises it seeks to recover has been used not just once or
twice but “customarily or habitually”

for an illegal trade or business like

the sale of illegal drugs. Grosfeld Realty Co. v Lagares, 150 Misc 2d 22, 23
(App Term, 1st Dept 1989); Clifton Ct., Inc. v Williams, NYLJ, May 27,
1998, at 28, col 6 (App Term, 2d Dept).

The illegal use “implies doing

something customarily or habitually upon the premises.” 855-79 LLC v.

SALAS , 40 A.D. 3d 553, 555(1st Dept. 2007) (testimony of neighbor that
son and grandson of tenant sold drugs outside the building late at night,
insufficient to establish customary or habitual or to infer that the tenant
acquiesced in illegal drug activity).

See also, 88-09 Realty v. Hill,

305

A.D. 2d 409 (1st Dept. 2003) (landlord established tenants’ apartment was
used for drug dealing where activities persisted over period of time and were
subject to neighbors’ complaints); N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Grillasca, 18 Misc. 3d
524, 527

(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2007); Cool NYC Apts. LLC v. Witter, 2018

two provisions are essentially the same and should be interpreted uniformly.
17

NY Slip Op 51485(U), 2018 NY Misc. LEXIS 4806(App. Term, 1st Dept.
2018) (eviction warranted for illegal drug activities where police recovered,
pursuant to a search warrant

37 zip block bags of marijuana, a digital

scale and $7230 in cash).
Contrary to defendant’s argument, there is no requirement under
these provisions that a petitioner serve a predicate notice to cure
commencement of a proceeding.

prior to

Spira v. Douglas, 67 Misc. 3d 258, 262

(Civil Ct., Bronx Co. 2019).

See,

Mullman v Hogan, 121 Misc 2d 719

(Civ Ct, NY County 1983);

cf. Fed. Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Tenenbaum, 63

Misc. 3d 313, 324 (Nassau Dist Ct 2019).

See also, Hunts Point Hous.

Dev. Fund Corp. V. Padilla , 2020 NY Slip OP 50708(u), supra.

See also.

Sherer, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York § 8:109.

RPAPL

§§711(5) and 715 are the procedural vehicles for implementing Real
Property Law §231 which is “a substantive statute that defines the legal
consequence of an illegal use on a tenancy.” Hudsonview Co., supra, 169
Misc. 2d at 390.

See Murphy v Relaxation Plus Commodore, Ltd., 83 Misc

2d 838, 839 (App Term, 1st Dept 1975).
Section 231 provides that whenever the leasee or tenant use the
premises or building, “or any part thereof, for an illegal trade, manufacture
or other business, the lease...shall become void” and the landlord may enter
the building.

Id at 391. “The statutory use of ‘void’...means that, as a

matter of substantive law, the illegal activity itself terminates the tenancy.”
Id.

The Bawdy House law therefore is premised on a different

legal

theory than the usual holdover proceeding; it is based upon a violation of
law, not a

holding over after expiration of the lease Murphy v Relaxation

Plus Commodore, Ltd., 83 Misc 2d 838, 839 (App Term, 1st Dept 1975)
Murphy, supra at 839.

It is therefore
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not necessary for the landlord to

serve a predicate termination notice as a condition precedent for bringing
an illegal use eviction proceeding.” Hudsonview Co. V. Jenkins, 169 Misc. 2d
389, 392 (Civil Ct., N.Y. Co 1996); Murphy, supra at 839.

See,

Samayoa LLC v. Nelson, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 50797(U), 2017 N Y Misc
LEXIS 2302 (Civil Ct., Bronx Co 2017).

See also, Aurora Associates LLC v

Hennen 157 AD3d 608 (1st Dept 2018) (Since the alleged conduct of
profiteering is incurable, no notice to cure is required).
Nor must a landlord prove the commission of the specific illegal acts.
Rather he must show that the acts and conduct proven “warrant
inference”

an

that the premises were being used for any illegal trade or

manufacture of other illegal business.

54 West 16th St. Apt. Corp. V

Dawson, 179 Misc. 2d 264, 269 ( Civil Ct., N.Y. Co. 1998); N.Y.C. Housing
Auth. V. Manley, N.Y.L.J. 1/2/1997 at 26 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co.);

N.Y. County

Dist. Attys Office v Rodriguez, 141 Misc. 2d 1050 1055 (Civil Ct., N.Y. Co.
1988).
Throughout the course of this case, the court stated that Boyd’s
development of an elaborate mechanism to view the girl through live
streaming, and his creation of many tapes
definition of
activity.

fell within the colloquial

“manufacturing,” and that Boyd clearly engaged in illegal

The court noted that the Certificate of Disposition Indictment,

dated June 4, 2010, indicates Boyd’s conviction of the crime of
“Possessing a Sexual Performance by a Child in violation of Penal Law (“PL”)
263.16 ( an E Felony) related to 17 tapes being found in his apartment
which depicted a naked 14 year-old neighbor lying in her bed masturbating.
Petitioner argued that the prohibition in federal and state law against child
pornography is so strong that even mere possession of tapes for personal use
was a crime.

It argued that Boyd’s manufacturing
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of and viewing child

pornography fell within the term “other illegal business” and thus within the
purview of the Bawdy House statute. Respondent countered that there was
no evidence that the tenant of record (Elizabeth Boyd) had any knowledge
regarding the allegations of illegal activity in the subject premises.
further contended that

It

petitioner did not provide evidence that Boyd

engaged in a business or that there was any ongoing nexus of illegal activity
with the apartment.

Rather, Boyd’s viewing of the tapes and or recordings

were akin to a tenant smoking marijuana in the apartment which has been
held to be beyond the purview of the RPAPL.

Respondent also argued that

Boyd’s activities outside of the apartment cannot be considered under
RPAPL §711(5).
The court disagrees that the case should be dismissed because
petitioner failed to prove that Boyd’s mother had any knowledge of his
activities is inapplicable.

The aforementioned requirement is a protection

that covers the tenant of record who has no knowledge of and does not
participate in the illicit activity yet faces eviction from the leasehold due to
illegal activities of others.

This protection obviously has no bearing herein

since petitioner is not seeking to evict Mrs. Boyd, who passed in 2010, but
rather her son who in essence is claiming that he is the tenant of record,
and has been residing in the premises because of 9 NYCRR §2204.6(d)(1).
See 855-79 LLC v. Salas, 40 A.D. 3d 553 (1st Dept. 2007).

In fact, the

notice of petition and petition do not name Elizabeth Boyd but rather
Michael Boyd as respondent tenant.4

4

Petitioner never explained why it commenced this case as a holdover petition rather than
as a summary proceeding pursuant to RPAPL §711(5) and Real Property Law §231. However,
Judge Marsden allowed the case to proceed under RPAPL 711
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The court also finds that Boyd utilized both the subject apartment
and the area around the premises, including the roof and stair wells, to
accomplish his scheme of transmitting live time images of the teenager to his
video camera and then viewing her in both his apartment and outside of the
premises.

It is not necessary to show that the actual apartment was used

for the illegal activity as long as there is “a sufficient nexus” between the use
of the apartment and the illegal activity.” RRW Realty Corp. V. Flores, 179
Misc 3d 757,761 (Civil Ct., Bronx Co 1999). The landlord-petitioner must
demonstrate that the premises were used to further an illegal business.

N.Y.C. Auth., v. Lipscomb-Arrovo, 2008 N.Y. Slip. Op 51085(U), 19 Misc 3
1140(A) (Civil Ct., Kings Co. 2008); City of New York v. Omolukum, 177
Misc 2d 796, 801-02 (N.Y.City Civ. Ct. 1998).
RPAPL 711(5) applies where “(t)he premises, or any part thereof, are
used or occupied...for any illegal activity.

The use of the premises is

specifically proscribed separate and apart from occupancy, and the term
premises “has a considerably broader scope than apartment” and reveals a
legislative intent to hold the occupants responsible for illegal activities outside
the apartment itself.

Flores, supra, 179 Misc. 3d at 761;

City of N.Y. v.

Rodriguez, 140 Misc. 2d 467, 469 (Civil Ct, N.Y. Co. 1988).
N.Y. v. Rodriguez, supra, the court found that the

In City of

appropriate meaning of

“premises” should be ascertained from the warranty of habitability owed to
tenants which extends from the occupancy of an apartment to the “public
hallways of the building, the elevators, the roof, the lobby, the main
entrance to the building, and adjacent recreational and parking areas.” Id at
469.

In fact, the dictionary (Merriam-Webster) defines premises as “a

building or part of a building usually with its grounds or other
appurtenances.”

Id. Therefore, the court found that individual’ illegal drug
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trade in "front of the building" was a sufficient nexus to his use of the
apartment to justify eviction under RPAPL 711 and 715.

The Exclusionary Rule is Inapplicable to this Proceeding
The court then noted that the crux of its decision on the second issue whether Boyd’s conduct fell within the ambit of the Bawdy house statutedepended on how much material that was suppressed in the criminal trial
would be allowed into evidence to show that Boyd engaged in illegal
manufacturing, trade or other illegal business.

After exhaustive argument,

the court ruled that neither the exclusionary rule nor its ancillary prohibition
against the admission of the fruit of the poisonous tree precluded the
admission into evidence of almost all of the items listed in petitioner’s Notice
to Admit.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the State's use of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself
violate the Constitution. See, Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S.
357, 362, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344, 351 (1998). Formulated as a “pragmatic
response” to police procedures violative of individual liberties, the
exclusionary rule is a “judicially created remedy” designed to deter illegal
search and seizures rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved." Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 1999),

citing to United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561,
(1974); People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12 (1978).

The

“paramount, if

not sole, justification for applying the exclusionary rule is its deterrent effect
on unlawful police behavior.” United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446, 49
L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1976);

United States v. Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. at

347 (1974); People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12(1978). As such, the rule
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does not “proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all
proceedings or against all persons.”
49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976).

Stone v. Powell,

428 U.S. 465, 486,

Since the exclusionary rule “is prudential

rather than constitutionally mandated.,” it is “applicable only where its
deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs.” See, Penn. Bd. of

Probation, supra,

524 U.S. at

363 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468

U.S. 897, 907, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984)).
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is an evidentiary rule that
operates in the context of criminal procedure. Townes v. City of New York,

supra, 176 F.3d at 145.

See, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,

484-88, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).

This doctrine excludes evidence

obtained as a result of information obtained through an unlawful search or
as a consequence of lawless official acts.

Costello v. United States, 365 U.S.

265, 280,, 5 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1961); Lee v. City of New York, 2011 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 2681 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2011). The doctrine is an extension of
the long-recognized exclusionary rule.” Townes, supra, 176 F. 3d at 145.

See, Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804,, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599
(1984).

Like the exclusionary rule, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine

“is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. at
348.

See,

United States v. Janis, supra, 428 U.S. at 446-47.

These doctrines were calculated “to deter future unlawful police
conduct” and protect liberty by creating an incentive--avoidance of the
suppression of illegally seized evidence--for state actors to respect the
constitutional rights of suspects.

Townes v. City of New York, supra, 176

F.3d at 145, citing to Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. at 347; United States v.
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Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-39, 45 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1975).

As such, the

rule does not “proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all
proceedings or against all persons,” (Stone v. Powell, supra, at 486), but
applies only in contexts “where its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously served.” United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348; United States

v. Janis, supra, 428 U.S. at 454.)

See, People v Mcgrath, supra, 46 N.Y.2d

at 21 (the Supreme Court applies a balancing approach and has refused to
apply the rule “in those areas where the ultimate effectuation of its remedial
objectives is only tenuously demonstrable” ).
Recognizing these costs, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to
extend the exclusionary rule to non criminal proceedings. See Pennsylvania

Bd. of Probation, supra, 524 U.S. at 363 (inapplicable to parole board
proceedings);

INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778

(1984) (Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule to civil deportation
proceedings);
proceedings);.

United States v. Calandra, supra (inapplicable to grand jury
See also, United States v. Jones, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

162830 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

In United States v. Janis, supra, 428 U.S. at

448, the Court held that the exclusionary rule did not bar the introduction
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in a civil tax proceeding because the
costs of excluding relevant and reliable evidence outweighed the marginal
deterrence benefits, “which... would be minimal because the use of the
exclusionary rule in criminal trials already deterred illegal searches.”
Similarly in Penn Bd. V. Scott, supra the Supreme Court found that
application of the exclusionary rule would hinder the functioning of state
parole systems and would provide only minimal deterrence.

“Because the

exclusionary rule precludes consideration of reliable, probative evidence, it
imposes significant costs: it undeniably detracts from the truth finding

24

process and allows many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape the
consequences of their actions.”

524 U.S. at 363.

Similarly, the exclusionary rule does not prohibit the introduction of
the “fruit of the poisonous tree” obtained through an unlawful search in a
civil trial. Lee v. City of New York, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2681 at 9 (Sup.
Ct, N.Y. Co. 2011).

See, Townes, supra, 176 F 3d at 145, where the

court found that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine was inapplicable to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions which are assessed on ordinary principles of tort
causation and entail little or nominal damages.

The rule should not be used

to elongate the chain of causation, and “[v]ictims of unreasonable searches
or seizures” cannot press Section 1983 claims for “injuries that result from
the discovery of incriminating evidence and consequent criminal
prosecution.” Vassiliou v. City of New York, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3433
(E.D.N.Y. 2021) citing to Townes, supra., 176 F.3d at 148.

Admission of

the fruit of the poisonous tree in civil actions is consonant with the purpose
underlying the exclusionary rule, namely to protect liberty and deter future
unlawful searches and seizures, as exclusion of this evidence “would vastly
overdeter state actors . . . and would distort basic tort concepts of
proximate causation.” Lee, supra, 2011 N.Y. Misc LEXIS 2681 at

10-11

citing to Townes, supra, 176 F3d at 145.
Likewise,

the police’s failure to continue to apprise Boyd of his

Miranda rights, after he refused to listen to the Miranda warning has no
bearing in the instant matter.

It is well established that a person taken

into “custodial interrogation” must first receive proper warnings pursuant to
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to admit the
statements into evidence in a criminal trial. 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694,(1966). Miranda warnings are a procedural safeguard rather an
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explicit right granted in the Fifth Amendment. Neighbour v. Covert, 68 F.3d
1508, 1510 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). Where
plaintiffs

are not attempting to suppress their statements in a criminal

proceeding, they cannot assert a cause of action for damages based on
Miranda in a civil rights action.

Piercy v. FRB, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

16581, 30-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) . See Aderonmu v. Heavey, 00 Civ. 9232,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 640, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2001).

See also,

United States v. Solano-Godines, 120 F.3d 957 United States v. Kadem,
317 F. Supp. 2d 239 (W.D.N.Y.2004); Cyrus v. City of New York, 450 Fed.
Appx. 24, 25 (2d Cir. 2011) (Miranda warnings need not be given in
deportation proceedings which are not criminal but civil in nature).
Statements

or evidence obtained by law enforcement based upon

alleged violations of a tenant’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights have not
been excluded from proceedings brought pursuant to RPAPL
715. In the leading case of Pleasant East Assocs. V. Soto,

§§711(5) and

1993 NYLJ

LEXIS 81 (Civil Ct, N.Y. Co. 1993) the court phrased the threshold issue as
follows:

whether the exclusionary rule is to be applied in a civil proceeding

to dispossess the tenant of an apartment on the grounds of the alleged illegal
use of the apartment.

The court answered the question in the negative.

Pursuant to a search warrant, the police had gathered reams of evidence
pointing to the use of and possible sale of drugs.

The respondents sought

to stay the proceeding pending the outcome of the criminal case or, in the
alternative determination by Civil court of the legality of the evidence and
statements obtained by the police.
The court first held that the sole justification for applying the
exclusionary rule is its deterrent effect on unlawful behavior.

Id at 5, citing

to U.S. v. Janis, supra, U.S. v Calandra, supra. Just as in those cases, the
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court found that “(t)he probable deterrent effect resulting from suppression
of illegally obtained evidence is insubstantial” since the gravamen of a
summary proceeding [is] to restore

possession of an apartment to a

landlord, collateral to the original purpose for obtaining the challenged

Id at 6, citing to People v. McGrath, supra 46 N.Y. 2d at 31.

evidence.

The purpose of
to provide

illegal use evictions under RPAPL §§711 and 715

an additional

is not

penalty for criminal behavior but to “protect

the inhabitants ... from prostitution, gambling and drug dealing.”

Id.

See, 54 West 16th St. Apt. Corp., supra, 79 Misc. 2d at 269.
Furthermore, the standards of proof in the two actions were totally
different since under the RPAPL

the petitioner need only prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to possession of the
premises." (Supra, at 26, col 4).

Put differently, “to assert a valid claim

pursuant to RPAPL 711(5), a petitioner need not prove the commission of
the specific illegal acts. Rather all that is necessary is that the acts and
conduct proven warrant an inference that the premises were being used ['for
any illegal trade or manufacture, or other illegal business')].”

Id.

See, 54

West 16th Street, supra, 179 Misc 2d at 269; New York City Hous. Auth. v

Manley, NYLJ, Jan. 8, 1997, at 26, col 2 (Civ Ct, NY Cty).

See, N.Y.C.

Housing Auth. V. Grillasca, 12 Misc 3d 223, 224 (Civil Ct., N.Y. Co. 2006)
(In a drug holdover proceeding brought

pursuant to RPAPL §711(5), the

court refused to preclude statements made by respondent to the police,
finding that any purported Miranda violations had to be raised in the
criminal court, not civil court).
Based on the above, this court will consider all of the evidence
gathered by the police to ascertain whether Boyd’s actions, which ultimately
resulted in a
RPAPL.

court order, involved any of the

grounds specified in the

The court notes parenthetically that Boyd’s rights against self
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incrimination and illegal search and seizures were already protected by
Justice DiMango’s decision and applying the exclusionary rule herein would
serve no further deterrence purpose.

Boyd admitted that he 1)

burglarized 136 Hicks Street and installed a video camera in an
air-conditioner in the bedroom of a 14 year old girl (victim) who resided at
said premises; 2)

replaced the existing air conditioner with a new one in

which the video camera was placed; and 3)

installed

a video camera in

the victim’s air- conditioner so that he could record and then observe the
girl in “various stages of undress” where she at times masturbated.. The
video camera was set up to wirelessly transmit the recordings to his
camcorder; Boyd stated that he needed to be “nearby” the device to retrieve
the recordings.

Boyd also testified that he

purchased assorted

transmitters and antennae to enable the transmission of signals between the
girl’s apartment and his mother’s apartment over the roofs of both buildings
and

facilitate his recording and viewing video images of the 14 year old

girl.

He admitted that he “stored the recordings in his apartment” by

making

17 video tapes of the victim masturbating in her bedroom over a

one year period and date stamping the tapes, and that he regularly edited
and downloaded the tapes in his apartment.
Petitioner presented as its expert witness Gary Olson, a professional in
the fields of video surveillance technology and equipment installation. Olson
designed wireless systems for residential buildings, command control vehicles
for first responders, Con Edison, and the NYC Police and Fire Departments.
Olson was familiar with the types of surveillance equipment that Boyd
purchased in 2000: they were a “relatively standard compliment of
equipment used for typical surveillance.” Supercircuits, the store that where
Boyd purchased the items, was

a catalog-type electronics store where

anyone could order parts and have them shipped. The invoices accepted into
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evidence listed video links which were designed to attach to a camera or
microphone and transmit to a receiver. The links consisted of a wireless
transmitter/receiver pair that could extend the range of a video signal over a considerable
distance. Olson opined that one would need some degree of technical knowledge to set up the
equipment, including battery systems, cameras, a microphone, etc.
Olson walked from the roof of 36 Clark to the roof of 136 Hicks as they were
connected to each other.

He identified unobstructed lines of sight running

from the furthest southern edge of the roof at
northern edge of 36 Clark.

136 Hicks to the furthest

He stated that unlike the roofs, the two

bedrooms are not within line-of-sight with each other.

However, the

three wireless links that Boyd purchased could carry the camera's signal
from the victim’s apartment to the parapet window in Boyd's bedroom,
since Boyd had installed

a

high grade antenna- a Yagi antenna - which

could transmit signals up to a mile and also improve the reception of
wireless signals and make the received images clearer. Olson observed a
metal fire escape stairwell, a parapet, and several metal poles on the roof
where the Yagi antennae could be placed for maximum effectiveness. Olson
stated that the Yagi antennae would enable a signal to be sent from the victim’s apartment to the
neighboring roof which would then “bounce” back into the stairwell of the building. The camera
and transmitter hidden in victim’s apartment (link one) could send signals to a receiver transmitter
on the roof of 136 Hicks (link two), which would transmit the signals to a third link receiver on
the roof of 36 Clark, which would transmit the signals to Mr. Boyd’s apartment. This is well
within the abilities and specifications of the equipment.
If the pinhole camera and short range transmitter were connected to the power in the air
conditioner vent, the camera could operate indefinitely and would constantly transmit videos.
The transmitter would send signals from the pin camera over to the receiver, and the output would
be transmitted through the three links to connect by wire into the Sony Handycam. The person
holding the receiver could not turn off the transmitter or manipulate the pinhole camera at the
location which would always be transmitting. The person at the receiving end (Boyd) would use
the Handycam to view and make tapes of the output of the pinhole camera that was currently
being recorded. However, if an individual did not use the apparatus for several days, he would
be unable to go back and see what happened during those days. The recording could take the
form of a series of still images or a video. One could connect the handycam to a computer and
download the still or video images from the Sony Handycam. Although websites such as
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YouTube, Instagram and Facebook did not yet exist in 2000, personal internet services did exist
and images and videos could be easily shared via e mail.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AS TO WHETHER BOYD’S AFORE-DESCRIBED
ACTIVITIES ARE PROHIBITED BY THE RPAPL
There is no case which discusses whether the illegal “manufacturing”
and viewing of child pornography is akin to the mere use, as opposed to the
sale or distribution of illegal drugs, or whether such described activity must
be “commercial in nature.”
petitioner, that

Nor is there any precedent, as

argued by

the illegal activities engaged in by Boyd are so heinous that

it is irrelevant whether Boyd actually engaged in a commercial enterprise.
As will be set forth below, this Court adopts petitioner’s argument.
Boyd’s extensive year long scheme to beam the young girl’s acts into his
home by means of transmission antennas and other apparatus, and his
creation of numerous tapes of the recordings, comes within the definition of
using the premises for illegal business, regardless of whether Boyd planned to
sell the tapes in a commercial transaction.

The distinction drawn in the

plethora of cases between merely using drugs and selling the drugs are inapt
since Boyd’s conduct went well beyond using an already manufactured item
on the computer for personal viewing.

Boyd engaged in the business of

manufacturing and creating a transmission scheme so that he could illegally
view an underage female masturbate over a period of time in live time and
then created at least 17 tapes of these recordings.

He utilized the home

of his mother to further his scheme.
Furthermore, Boyd’s actions constituted a modern day version of using
or occupying the premises as a bawdy-house, or house or place of assignation
for lewd persons, or for purposes of prostitution.

As will be explained

below, this phrase is separated by the word “or” from the other phrase in
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§711 (5) -“any illegal trade or manufacture, or other illegal business.”
Nothing in the actual text of §§711(5) or 715 requires proof of commercial
purpose and there is no precedent requiring proof of commercial purpose in
order to prove that the premises was used as a place of assignation for lewd
persons..
A court’s “primary consideration,” when presented with a question of
statutory interpretation, is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the Legislature."
524( 2019);

Mtr of Walsh v. N.Y. State Comptroller, 34 N.Y.3d 520,

Nadkos, Inc. v Preferred Contrs. Ins. Co. Risk Retention Group

LLC, 34 N.Y. 3d 1,7-8 (2019) quoting Mtr of

Lemma v Nassau County

Police Officer Indem. Bd., 31 NY3d 523, 528 (2018). When interpreting a
statute which has clear and unambiguous language, the court must derive
the legislative intent from the plain meaning of the words, as the statutory
text is the clearest indicator of legislative intent.

Mtr of Peyton v N.Y.C. Bd.

of Stds. & Appeals, 2020 N.Y Lexis 2873 at 8 (2020);

Mtr. Of DeVera v.

Elia, 32 N.Y. 3d 423, 435 (2018) citing to Mtr of Lemma supra, 31 N.Y.
3d at 528; Nadkos, Inc. supra,

34 N.Y.3d at 8; Doctors Council v. New

York City Employees' Retirement System, 71 N.Y.2d 669, 674-675
(1988).
The language of a statute is generally construed “according to its most
natural and ...obvious sense.” Lohan v. Take- Two Interactive Software, Inc.,
31N.Y. 3d 111, 11 (2018) citing to Samiento v. World Yacht Inc., 10 N.Y.
3d 70, 77-78(2008).

“In the absence of a statutory definition, we

construe words of ordinary import with their usual and commonly
understood meaning, and in that connection have regarded dictionary
definitions as useful guideposts in determining the meaning of a word or
phrase.”

Nadkos, supra, 34 N.Y. 3d at 8
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quoting Yaniveth R. v LTD

Realty Co., 27 N.Y.3d 186, 192 (2016); Walsh, supra, 34 N.Y 3d at 524.
Further, a statute “must be construed as a whole and its various sections
must be considered together and with reference to each other.”

N.Y.

Mtr. of

County Lawyers' Assn. v Bloomberg, 19 N.Y.3d 712, 721 (2012).

The meaning of words are ascertained by reference to “the words and
phrases with which they are associated.”

Statutes, §239(a); Mtr of DeVera,

supra, 32 N.Y. 3d at 436.
In the most recent case of Bostock v. Clayton Cty, 207 L.Ed. 2d 218
(2020), Justice Gorsuch specifically found that the straightforward
application of Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination because of “sex,”
interpreted in accord with its “ordinary public meaning at the time of (its)
enactment,” barred the termination of employees simply for being
homosexual or transsexual.

Id at 234.

Justice Gorsuch engaged in

tenets of statutory construction which are particularly apt to the instant
matter.

He found that while those who adopted the Civil Rights Act

might not have anticipated their work would lead to this result, and many
were not thinking about “many of the Act’s consequences that have become
apparent over the years,” such as the prohibition against discrimination on
the basis of motherhood or its ban on sexual harassment, “the limits of the
drafters’ imagination supply no reason to ignore the law’s demands.”

207

L. Ed 2d, at 230.
Justice Gorsuch then addressed the employer’s arguments that since
Title VII had a specific list of protected characteristics such as sex and
religion that did not include homosexuality and transgender status, the
latter two were implicitly excluded from Title VII’s coverage - in other
words, had Congress wanted to address these matters, it would have
specifically referenced them in Title VII.
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207 L. Ed d at 240.

The Court

indicated that there is no such thing as a “canon of donut holes” in which
Congress’ failure

“to speak directly to a specific case that falls within a

more general statutory rules creates a tacit exception.”

Id.

Instead, when

Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, the broad
rule applies.

Id. Thus, while sexual harassment and motherhood

discrimination are conceptually distinct from sex discrimination, they fall
within Title VII”s broad sweep.
The Court also debunked the argument that few legislators would have
intended or expected in 1964 that Title VII apply to discrimination against
homosexual and transgender persons, given the lack of ambiguity in the
statute’s text.

207 L. Ed d at 242-43. The fact that the statute’s

application reaches “beyond the principal evil” the legislators may have
intended or expected to address, or that the statute has been applied to
situations not expressly anticipated by Congress “does not demonstrate
ambiguity” but rather “demonstrates [the] breadth of a legislative
command.” Id at 243 citing to Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
499, 87L.Ed d 346(1985).

See also, A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law:

“The Interpretation of Legal Texts” 101(2012) (unexpected application of
broad language reflect only Congress’s “presumed point [to] produce general
coverage –not to leave room for courts to recognize ad hoc exceptions”).
Furthermore, the Court has always rejected the argument that it should
refuse to enforce the plain terms of the law because a “new application” has
emerged that is both “unexpected and important.” Id at 244 - 246.

In

sum, since Congress adopted “broad language” in framing Title VII, the
necessary consequence of the legislative choice is that an employer who fires
an employee merely for being gay or transgender defies the law.
249.
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Id at

The Botstock decision reiterated the Supreme Court’s prior ruling that
“(w)hile statutes should not be stretched to apply to new situations not
fairly within their scope, they should not be so narrowly construed as to
permit their evasion because of changing habits due to new inventions and
discoveries.”

Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S.

390, 395, n.16; 20 L. Ed. 2d 1176, 1181 (1968) (whether petitioner’s
community antenna television (“CATV”) systems “performed” respondent’s
copyrighted work, as defined under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §1 by
broadcasting movies). Therefore, when faced with the application of a
statute, drafted long before the development of the electronic phenomena
before it, a court

“must read the statutory language of 60

years ago in

light of drastic technological change.”Fortnightly Corp, supra,, 392 U.S. at
395, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 1181.
The California Supreme Court has ruled that in construing statutes
that predate their possible applicability to new practices or technology,
“courts have not relied on wooden construction of their terms.” Apple v.

Superior Court, 56 Cal. 4th 128, 137, 29 P d 883, 897 (2013) (although
the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act was “enacted in 1990, almost a decade
before online commercial transactions became widespread,” that fact did
not preclude the statute's application to such transactions). Fidelity to
legislative intent does not “make it impossible to apply a legal text to
technologies that did not exist when the text was created” as the drafters
knew that technology will proceed and that the “rules they create will one
day apply to all sorts of circumstances they could not possibly envision.”

Id., citing to

Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal

Texts (2012) pp. 85–86.)

Therefore, in applying existing statutes to new

circumstances, the courts must first inquire how the legislature “would have
handled the problem if it had anticipated it.”
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Ward v. Tilly’s Inc., 31 Cal.

App. 5th 1167, 243 Cal. Repr. 3d 461 (Ct of Appeals Second App. Dist.,
2019).

There, the California Court of Appeals ruled that

retail store

employees were due reporting time pay pursuant to Wage Order 7, when
they called into the store two hours before their shift. Although at the time
Wage Order 7 was enacted, telephonic reporting had not been
contemplated, such “contemporaneous understanding of 'report for work'
(was) not dispositive,” since its history reveals that the purpose in adopting
reporting time pay requirements was two-fold: to “‘compensate employees’
and ‘encourage proper notice and scheduling.’” Id. at 472-72. Therefore,
had the “Industrial Welfare Commission ("IWC") considered the issue, it
would have concluded that telephonic call-in requirements trigger reporting
time pay, and that the on-call scheduling alleged . . . triggers Wage Order
7's reporting time pay requirements” even though the employees did not
physically show up to work and then were

Id. at 473.

See also,

O’'Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72,
104-05 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that an online news magazine constitutes
a “periodical publication” under a law that was enacted well before the
advent of digital magazines).
The New York Courts have also addressed how to analyze statutory
terms in light of technological advances.

In Mtr of Comptroller of City of

N.Y. v. Mayor of City of N.Y., 7 N.Y.3d 256 (2006) the Court of Appeals
determined that the term “property” included in

the NYC Charter § 362

(a)- which provides that a “ "Concession" shall mean a grant made by an
agency for the private use of city-owned property for which the city receives
compensation... - was not limited to only “real
intangible or intellectual property.

property” but also included

The only qualifier to the term

“property” in the statute was “city owned” - and the drafters

had

removed the word “on” before the term “city owed property,” thereby
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demonstrating some intent not to limit the types of property covered by
section 362 (a).

7 N.Y.3d at 264-65.

Furthermore,

“(i)t would be an

unjust reflection upon the wisdom and intelligence of the [legislature] to
assume that they intended to confine the scope of their legislation to the
present, and to exclude all consideration for the developments of the future.”
7 N.Y. 3d at 266.
In Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. 31 N.Y. 3d 11
(2006), the Court of Appeals held that an avatar-

a graphical

representation of person in a video game or like media - may constitute a
portrait within the meaning of Civil Rights Law §§50 and 51.

These two

statutes, enacted in 1903, created a limited right of privacy by requiring a
living person’s written consent before their “name, portrait or picture” for
advertising purposes.

In response to the query as to how a reasonable

person in 1903 could even imagine much less equate a portrait with
computer imagery, the Court replied that it must employ the theory of
statutory construction that “general terms encompass future developments
and technological advancements.”

31 N.Y. 3d at 121. “In view of the

proliferation of information technology and digital communication, a
graphical representation in a video game or like media may constitute a
‘portrait’ within the meaning of the Civil Rights Law.”

Id. At 122.

See

People v. Fraser, 264 A.D. 2d 105 (4th Dept 2000) aff’d 96 N.Y. 2d 318(
(2001), where the Fourth Department upheld a jury instruction that a
“photograph”

could include a computer graphic image and noted that

"it

is impossible for the Legislature to consider every societal and technological
change that may occur and the effect those changes may have upon the
particular conduct it is seeking to regulate,"
the

264 A.D.2. at 109 and that

Legislature did not have to amend the law to accommodate every

advancement in technology.

Id. At 110.
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See also,

See also, People v.

Santiago,1999 N.Y. Slip Op 40004(U), 1999 NY. Misc. 671 (Co Ct. Monroe
Cty 1999) (“ this court must try to harmonize

technology with statutory

construction in accordance with the plain purpose, viz, the underlying policy,
of the legislative enactment” ).

Application to Instant Matter
Applying these tenets of statutory construction to the instant matter,
it is clear that Boyd’s conduct falls within the term of other illegal business
or illegal manufacture and constitutes the modern day version of engaging in
illegal lewd behavior by use of technology.

Certain of the terms included

within §§ 711 and 715 are unambiguous and cover Boyd’s conduct.

The

ordinary meaning of the term “manufacture” is “[a thing that is made or
built by a human being or by a machine) as distinguished from something
that is the product of nature.” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th edition) as cited
in Baird Props., LL v. Town of Coventry, 2015 R.I. Super. LEXIS 111
(Superior Court R.I. 2015) .

See also, Lonesource, Inc. V. United Stationers

Supply co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44023 (E.D.N.C. Western Div. 2013)
(“manufacturer” is a person or entity “engaged in producing or assembling
new products” citing to Blacks Law Dictionary 984 (8th

ed 2004)).

Clearly Boyd manufactured a product by strategically placing antennae,
transmitters and receivers in the girl’s apartment and on the roofs so that
he could view the continuous recording of the teenage girl in his mother’s
apartment on his camcorder.

Furthermore, Boyd manufactured 17 tapes

from the continuous recordings which were transmitted to his camcorder,
These activities constituted manufacturing and, by virtue of his conviction
under Penal Law §263,
constituted

his recording of a minor in compromising positions

“illegal manufacturing.”
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It is also clear that Boyd engaged in an Illegal activity or business
endeavor to record the teenage in her home and create tapes of such
conduct. In Atl. Cas. Ins. Co. v. River Hills Antique Tractor Club, Inc., 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2266, *18 (Mo. E.D. 2012 ), the parties disputed whether
the definition of business had a definite or legal meaning which included
“some element of commercial enterprise or profit motive.”

Id., at *16.

Each side quoted different dictionary definitions, including Black’s Law
Dictionary, 198 (6th Ed. 1990), which defines business as “[t]hat which
habitually busies or occupies or engages the time, attention, labor and effort
of persons as a principal serious concern or interest or for livelihood or
profit.”

The court found that despite the existence of different meanings

for the term business, the term was not ambiguous and that not all
definitions of “‘business’ include a commercial or profit aspect.” Id at 18-19.
The court pointed to one definition of business - “A matter or affair that
engages a person's time, care and attention; that which one does for a
livelihood; occupation; employment; mercantile concerns, or traffic in
general; ... what belongs to one to do; task or object undertaken; concern;
right of action or interposing; affair; point; matter...” (New Webster
Encyclopedia Dictionary of the English Language109 (1952 Ed.)) -

as

proof that business is “often used independently of an notion of profit” and
is used in the broader sense to
‘livelihood.’”

Id., at 18-19.

“to describe one’s ‘affairs, activities’” or

See also, People v. Johnson, 52 Misc. 2d

1087 (Crim Ct., N.Y. Co. 1967), citing to People v Gilette, 172 Misc. 847,
849 (City Ct., Rochester, 1939), where the court found that the term
“business” in VTL §20(4), which limited the use of a motor vehicle a holder
of a junior permit to the “usual and ordinary pursuit of the business of the
parent or guardian” was not restricted solely to a productive trade,
profession or occupation.

The court looked to the broader definition of

business found in the Standard Dictionary which provided: “1. A pursuit or
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occupation; trade; profession; calling; also, commercial affairs. 2. A matter
or affair. 3. Interest; concern; duty. 4. A commercial enterprise or
establishment. 5. A state of being busy.”

People v. Gillette, supra, 172 Misc.

at 849, 850).
This court adopts the broad definition of business set forth above,
which is confirmed by the definition of “business” found in Black’s Law
Dictionary, i.e., “[t]hat which habitually busies or occupies or engages the
time, attention, labor and effort of persons as a principal serious concern or
interest.” The court finds that Boyd’s creation over a year of a laborious
technological set up to continuously tape the minor over a year, and his
creation of 17 tapes of these recordings habitually busied and occupied his
time as a serious concern or interest regardless of whether he earned money
for this endeavor, Although petitioner does not claim that Boyd sold the
obscene material which he produced, he nonetheless conceded in his
testimony that he busied himself with watching the obscene videotapes that
he produced.

Accordingly, this court deems Boyd’s violation of PL § 263.16

to be a ground for his eviction under RPAPL § 711(5). No where in the text
of RPAPL §§711(5) or 715 is there a requirement that the illegal or
manufacture or business or

immoral conduct be commercial, and only a

few civil court decisions have read into the text the requirement that there
be a commercial activity.

Based upon the plain language of the statute and

the canons of statutory construction, this court chooses not to read said
requirement into these statutory provisions.
Historically, in order for a petitioner to prevail under RPAPL
§§711(5) and 715, he must

show that the tenant is using the premises

“for an illegal or immoral purpose.”

See generally, Paragon Realty Corp. v.

Kelly, 1996 NYLJ LEXIS 881 at 13 (Civil Court,
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Bronx County,

10/30/1996); Grosfeld Realty Co. v. Lagares, 150 Misc. 2d 22 (App. Term,
1st Dept. 1989); Lloyd Realty Corp. v. Albino, 146 Misc. 2d 841(Civ Ct.
N.Y.1990); City of New York v. Rodriguez, 140 Misc. 2d 467 (Civ. Ct. Co
1988).

Therefore, the terms “any illegal trade, manufacture or other

illegal business” in RPAPL §711(5) were interpreted in light of the preceding
terms “bawdy house”or place of assignation for lewd persons.

In Spira v.

Spiratone Inc., 148 Misc. 2d

787 (Civil Ct., Queens Co. 1990), the court

denied petitioner’s landlord’s

request to expand the definition of “illegal

use”

to include public assembly for church purposes, despite the landlord’s

contention that the illegality was

based upon building code violations such

as inadequate exits, lack of fire retardent etc. and the “immediate danger
and potential life threatening hazard” caused by the use.
The court first construed the terms “illegal trade, manufacture or
business” in §711(5)

to be an activity which is either criminal in nature,

such as gambling, theft or prostitution,

or an illegal manner of conducting

an otherwise legal activity, such as the illegal manufacture of goods.” 148
Misc 2d 789.

The court then found that apart from specifying the use of

the premises as a place of assignation for lewd persons or a bawdy house, the
RPAPL contained no definition of what was encompassed under the phrase
“or for any illegal trade, or manufacture, or other illegal business”
789 citing to 2 Rasch, N.Y. Landlord and Tenant
§34.3 at 529.

Id. at

–Summary Proceedings

“There must be a showing that the tenant has departed

from the legitimate or legal use for which the premises were hired, by some
measurable degree of continuity of acts of vice related to the occupancy of
the premises or to the method of conducting the business therein.”

2

Dolan, Rasch's Landlord and Tenant--Summary Proceedings § 34:5, at 516
[4th ed]

See. Solow Bldg. Co., II, L.L.C. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 13 Misc.

3d 55 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2006).

The court found the cases advanced
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by the landlord were inapposite since they involved “inherently criminal and
immoral activities such as gambling, prostitution and theft, none of which
pertained to the running of a church.”

Id at 790

Simply put, the fact

that the respondents operate the church in violation of the certification of
activity did not constitute an activity that fell with the meaning of an illegal
trade or business under §711(5).

See also, New York v. Rodriguez, supra,

140 Misc. 2d at 470 (Another factor to be taken into consideration is the
“ill repute” of the building or the occupants thereof).

See, Mtr of

Kellner,

NYLJ, Nov. 26, 1986, at 11, col 6 (Civ Ct, NY County).
In 1165 Broadway Corp. v. Dayana of N.Y. Sportswear, Inc., 166
Misc. 2d 939, 944-947 (Civil Ct., N.Y. Co. 1995), the court engaged in an
intensive analysis of the legislative history of RPAPL 715 which this court
adopts herein.

The court found that a “a plain reading of the statute” and

the legislative history supported a “nonrestrictive application” of RPAPL
715 (1) to “any illegal business, trade or manufacture,” and that said
language covered an illegal business involving the sale and storage of
counterfeit trademark goods:

“By their very terms, these statutes were

specifically intended to address any illegal business, trade or manufacture
and should not be interpreted to arbitrarily exclude those illegal businesses
which fail to directly impact on the health, morals, welfare or safety of the
public,” as urged by the respondents.

166 Misc. 2d at 943.

The court then found that nothing in the legislative history of RPAPL
715 (1) would warrant the restrictive construction urged by the
respondents. In 1868, the Legislature first passed an amendment to a
statute that became known as the “bawdy-house” law, which

provided

that the owner of “any house or other real property  used or occupied as a
bawdy house, or house of assignation for lewd person” could apply for a
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"warrant of dispossession." (L 1868, ch 764, § 55) In 1880, the statute was
amended and placed in the Code of Civil Procedure as section 2231 (4). The
revised statute provided that the landlord could remove a tenant from
property “where the demised premises, or any part thereof, are used or
occupied as a bawdy-house, or house of assignation for lewd persons, or for
any illegal trade or manufacture, or other illegal business.”(L 1880, ch
178.).

The

1947 Bill Jacket accompanying the amendments to the

statute included a recommendation for approval by New York County
Lawyers' Association which noted that the amendment "broadens the scope
of the law" by including "not merely cases of lewdness, but also 'any illegal
trade, business or manufacture' ," such as

"gambling, or the surreptitious

distillation of alcohol".
In fact, many courts have ruled that for a petitioner to prevail under
RPAPL §§711(5) and 715, he must

show that the tenant is using the

premises “for an illegal or immoral purpose”. See generally, Paragon Realty

Corp. v. Kelly, 1996 NYLJ LEXIS 881 at 13 (Civil Court,

Bronx County,

10/30/1996); Grosfeld Realty Co. v. Lagares, 150 Misc. 2d 22 (App. Term,
1st Dept. 1989); Lloyd Realty Corp. v. Albino, 146 Misc. 2d 841(Civ Ct.
N.Y.1990); City of New York v. Rodriguez, 140 Misc. 2d 467 (Civ. Ct. Co
1988).
Therefore, the legislative history of RPAPL §§711(5) and 715 reveal
that illegal business was traditionally interpreted within the context of lewd
or immoral conduct.

The term “lewdness” is not a legal term of art but a

word of common usage.

State ex rel Miller v. Rear Door Bookstore, 1991

Ohio App. LEXIS 1243 at 8 (Ct of Appeals of Ohio, 10th App. Dist. 1991).
Webster Dictionary defines “lewd” as ...”sexually unchaste or
licentious...lascivious inciting to sexual desire or imagination”
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Id at 9, where

as Black's Law Dictionary, 11th Edition, defines “lewd” as “[o]bscene or
indecent; tending to moral impurity or wantonness,” while “lewdness” is
defined as “[g]ross, wanton, and public indecency that is outlawed by many
state statutes; a sexual act that the actor knows will likely be observed by
someone who will be affronted or alarmed by it.” See, People v Fibble,
2015 NY Slip Op 51822(U), 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4511, *7 (Crim. Ct.
Kings Co. 2015).

The New Oxford American Dictionary defines lewd as

“crude and offensive in a sexual way.”

(Third ed., 2010).

The common definition of “lewd” clearly shows that there are
activities of a sexual nature which are beyond the limits of what society
deems tolerable.”

State ex rel Miller, supra at 12 .

Black's Law

Dictionary, 11th Edition, defines “lewd” as “[o]bscene or indecent; tending
to moral impurity or wantonness,” while “lewdness” is defined as “[g]ross,
wanton, and public indecency that is outlawed by many state statutes; a
sexual act that the actor knows will likely be observed by someone who will
be affronted or alarmed by it.” See, People v Fibble,

2015 NY Slip Op

51822(U), 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4511, *7 (Crim. Ct. Kings Co. 2015).
The New Oxford American Dictionary defines lewd as “crude and offensive in
a sexual way.”

(Third ed., 2010). Lewd has been defined as “characterized

by lust, obscene or indecent,” and

“offensive to accepted standards of

decency.” and “not so arcane as to escape the understanding of the average
juror”.

People v. Pinkoski, 300 A.D.2d 834, 837-38 (3d Dept. 2002).

One court has found that, like acts of obscenity, lewd acts are measured by
the average citizen applying contemporary community standards (Penal Law
§ 235.00 [1]).
Crim. Ct. 2016).

People v Wade, 51 Misc. 3d 612, 617-618 (Kings Co.
While these definitions are broad and not identical, they

clearly encompass the activities of Boyd described above.
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In fact, implicit in Boyd’s conviction under Penal Law §263, much less
Boyd’s broader conduct in creating the videos and tapes, is the recognition
that the materials he created might make their way into the outside market
for sale and exploitation of the youth.

Penal Law §263.16 provides that:

“A person is guilty of possessing a sexual performance by a child when,
knowing the character and content thereof, he knowingly has in his
possession or control, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, any
performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years
of age.”

“The Fourth Department

found that the

statute’s purpose in

prohibiting possession of child pornography, in every form,

was a means to

“eradicate the market for such material, and that former Governor Pataki
had noted that

"(s)omeone who possesses ]

child pornography does so at

the expense of an exploited child, and society cannot hope to eradicate this
evil unless the market for these perverse materials is destroyed" (Governor's
Mem approving L 1996, ch 11, 1996 NY Legis Ann, at 630).
at 110.

264 A.D.2d

Therefore, the prohibition against possession was inextricably

linked to the goal of eradicating the spread of these materials in the
perverted market that exploited children Id at 110-11. A graphic image of
a child engaged

in sexual conduct captures the child's humiliation and

preserves it into the future as permanently as does any photograph.

Id.

Furthermore, the advent of the computers “to transmit and possess child
pornography can only increase the market for child pornography--especially
with the clarity of images, the speed of transmission, and the ability to
upload or download the images with ease" Id citing to

State v Cohen, 696

So 2d 435, 440, n 5 ( Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, 1997).

In sum, this court finds that Boyd’s extensive year long scheme to
beam the young girl’s acts into his home by means of transmission antennae
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and other apparatus,

and his creation of numerous tapes of the recordings,

comes within the definition of using the premises for illegal business
regardless of whether Boyd planned to sell the tapes in a commercial
transaction.

The distinction drawn in the plethora of cases between

merely using drugs and selling the drugs are inapt since Boyd’s conduct went
well beyond using an already manufactured item on the computer for
personal viewing. In other words, Boyd did more than just view the
pornography on the computer and create tapes of the pornography
Boyd engaged in the business of manufacturing illegal child pornography by
creating an elaborate transmission scheme in or about his premises so that
he could view the underage female in various sexual acts in real time.
This Court also finds that Boyd’s conviction under

PL § 263.16,

and his underlying actions in utilizing the premises and its surroundings to
create a

technological apparatus to view a child masturbating in live time

for over a year, constitutes a

continuity of acts of vice or lewdness related

to the occupancy of the premises.

The legislature could not have been

expected to anticipate, when it first started passing the Bawdy House Laws,
that

technology and video conferencing and video usage would permit

someone to invade the privacy of a minor’s home and illegally view and
create tapes of sexual acts that exploited the minor and aroused

lewd and

lascivious feelings in the eyes of the beholder,
Although Boyd met the first prong of 9 NYCRR § 2204.6(d), since his
conviction and conditions of parole were tantamount to a court order which
prevented him from residing at the subject premises for the

requisite two

year period prior to the tenant of record’s death, he did not meet the
second prong. His court order and his underlying actions constituted grounds
for eviction specified in the RPAPL.

Therefore, Boyd does not meet the
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residency requirement and he is not entitled to succeed to the tenancy of
Elizabeth Boyd.

Petitioner is directed to prepare an order of eviction for

this court to sign. This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.
Dated: February 22, 2021
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